The Desoto patrol continued with another destroyer, the Turner Joy (DD-951), coming along to ward off further trouble. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 2. Although Washington officials did not believe Hanoi would attack the Desoto ships again, tensions ran high on both sides, and this affected their respective analyses of the events to come. They arrived on station overhead by 2100 hours. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in combating unconventional opponents and the potential consequences of relying too heavily on a single source of intelligence. Originally begun by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961, 34A was a highly-classified program of covert operations against North Vietnam. President Johnson himself apparently questioned the sailorsu0019 report of an attack. To the northwest, though they could not see it in the blackness, was Hon Me; to the southwest lay Hon Nieu. Message, COMUSMACV 291233Z July 1964, CP 291345Z July 1964. But in the pre-dawn hours of July 31, 1964, U.S.-backed patrol boats shelled two North Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident famously gave the Johnson Administration the justification they needed to escalate the Vietnam War. On 30 July, Westmoreland revised the 34A maritime operations schedule for August, increasing the number of raids by "283% over the July program and 566% over June. Mr. Andrad is a Vietnam War historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where he is writing a book on combat operations from 1969 through 1973. The boats followed at their maximum speed of 44 knots, continuing the chase for more than 20 minutes. Such arguments are rooted in the information and documents released by Daniel Ellsberg and others, and were reinforced over the decades by anniversary interviews with some of the participants, including ships crewmen and officers. These PTFs were manned by South Vietnamese crews and conducted a series of coastal attacks against targets in North Vietnam as part of Operation 34A. This was the first of several carefully worded official statements aimed at separating 34A and Desoto and leaving the impression that the United States was not involved in the covert operations.9 Gradually, the Navy broadened its role from supply/logistics to aid/advisory -- training Vietnamese and developing the South Vietnamese navy's famed "brown water force," those riverine units operating in the country's matrix of rivers and canals and through the coastal network of islands and archipelagos. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decided to resume Maddoxs Desoto patrol, but at a greater distance from the coast, accompanied by Turner Joy and supported by aircraft from Ticonderoga. PTF-6 took up station at the mouth of the Ron River, lit up the sky with illumination rounds, and fired at the security post. In Saigon, General William C. Westmoreland, the new commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), approved of the plan, and SOG began testing 81-mm mortars, 4.5-inch rockets, and recoilless rifles aboard the boats. Both sides, however, spent August 3 reviewing their contingency plans and analyzing lessons learned from the incident. Most uncertainty has long centered on the alleged second attack of August 4. A subsequent review of the SIGINT reports revealed that this later interceptMcNamaras smoking gunwas in fact a follow-on, more in-depth report of the August 2 action. The Health Conspiracy. In November of 2001, the LBJ Presidential library and museum released tapes of phone conversations with the President and then Defense In the subsequent exchange of fire, neither American nor North Vietnamese ships inflicted significant damage. The North also protested the South Vietnamese commando raid on Hon Me Island and claimed that the Desoto Mission ships had been involved in that raid. Both the Phu Bai station and Maddoxs DSU knew the boats had orders to attack an enemy ship., Not knowing about the South Vietnamese commando raid, all assumed that Maddox was the target. The commander also added the requirement of collecting photographic intelligence of ships and aircraft encountered, as well as weather and hydrographic information. (Hanoi remains muzzy on the second incident, Aug. 4, presumably since clearly it took place in international waters, the Vietnamese claim of "defensive reaction" is a bit wobbly.). Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964) | National Archives A joint resolution of Congress dated August 7, 1964, gave the president authority to increase U.S. involvement in the war between North and South Vietnam and served as the legal basis for escalations in the Johnson and Nixon administrations that likely dwarfed what most Americans could have imagined in August 1964. It still is not clear whether the order was intended to halt the attack or to delay it until after nightfall, when there was a much greater chance for success. PTF-1 and PTF-5 raced toward shore. The North Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made all this clear in September when it published a "Memorandum Regarding the U.S. War Acts Against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the First Days of August 1964." Despite McNamaras nimble answers, North Vietnams insistence that there was a connection between 34A and the Desoto patrols was only natural. People are human and make mistakes, particularly in the pressure of a crisis or physical threat to those they support. The report covers all aspects of the efforts of the various American SIGINT agencies from the early postWorld War II years through the evacuation of Saigon. Two nearly identical episodes six weeks apart; two nearly opposite responses. The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia. Moises book, however, was based on only the few SIGINT reports he was able to obtain through the Freedom of Information Act. Ships radar detected five patrol boats, which turned out to be P-4 torpedo boats and Swatows. The U.S. ships were supposed to remain well outside North Vietnams claimed five nautical mile territorial limit. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution - Definition, Cause & Significance Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. Office of the Historian Kennedy Hickman is a historian, museum director, and curator who specializes in military and naval history. Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the NSC, 4 August 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m.. 13. And so, in the course of a single day, and operating on imperfect information,Johnson changedthe trajectory of the Vietnam War. But only a few minutes later, McNamara was back on the line with news of a second incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. The after-action reports from the participants in the Gulf arrived in Washington several hours after the report of the second incident. Arguing that he did not seek a "wider war," Johnson stated the importance of showing that the United States would "continue to protect its national interests." NSA analysts from shore-based stations shared Herricks belief and transmitted an immediate warning to all major Pacific Theater commandsexcept to Herrick and Maddox. 14. Until the ICC investigation blew over a week later, the commandos camped on a small pier. Hanoi denied the charge that it had fired on the U.S. destroyers on 4 August, calling the charge "an impudent fabrication. National Security Agency By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated. By including the orders and operational guidance provided to the units involved, the study develops the previously missing context of the intelligence and afteraction reports from the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. It is not NSA's intention to prove or Gulf of Tonkin incident Facts Gulf of Tonkin incident - Wikipedia 136-137. Hanoi was more than willing to tell the world about the attacks, and it took either a fool or an innocent to believe that the United States knew nothing about the raids. Carl Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer with 10 years of experience as a surface line officer. "11 3. History is who we are and why we are the way we are.. In less than 25 minutes, the attack was over. Did Johnson learn something from the first experience? The disclaimer is required, if for no other reason than because of Chapter 15, "The American Response to the Gulf of Tonkin Attacks," about which more later. Illumination rounds shot skyward, catching the patrol boats in their harsh glare. Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations. But, to me, the more pernicious deception was this idea that American ships were sailing innocently in the Gulf of Tonkin and were attacked without provocation, he continues. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. The United States denied involvement. He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, Americas Last Vietnam Battle (Hippocrene Books, 1994), and Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Lexington Books, 1990). In any event, the attack took place in broad daylight under conditions of clear visibility. Suddenly, North Vietnamese guns opened fire from the shore. The ships sonar operator reported a noise spikenot a torpedowhich the Combat Information Center (CIC) team mistook for report of an incoming torpedo. . By then, the two American ships were approximately 80 nautical miles from the nearest North Vietnamese coastline and steaming southeast at 20 knots. He then requested the passage of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." Fluoride. During May, Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, the Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief, had suggested that 34A raids could be coordinated "with the operation of a shipboard radar to reduce the possibility of North Vietnamese radar detection of the delivery vehicle." Each boat carried a 16-man crew and a 57-mm recoilless rifle, plus machine guns. PTF-1 and PTF-2 were U.S.-built 1950s vintage boats pulled out of mothballs and sent to Vietnam. 1, p. 646. Our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. WebKnown today as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, this event spawned the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 7 August 1964, ultimately leading to open war between North Vietnam and Whether they produced battlefield images of the dead or daguerreotype portraits of common soldiers, []. The Americans claimed they sank two torpedo boats and damaged a third, while the torpedo boats claimed to have shot down two American aircraft. Hickman, Kennedy. Forty-eight hours earlier, on Aug. 2, two US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin the Maddox and the Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese boats. The string of intelligence mistakes, mistranslations, misinterpretations and faulty decision making that occurred in the Tonkin Gulf in 1964 reveals how easily analysts and officials can jump to the wrong conclusions and lead a nation into war. 302-303. "4 Then, everyones doubts were swept away when a SIGINT intercept from one of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats reported the claim that it had shot down two American planes in the battle area. Milestones: 19611968 - Office of the Historian For 25 minutes the boats fired on the radar station, then headed back to Da Nang. WebCongress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution before the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. Ticonderoga ordered four A-1H Skyraiders into the air to support the ships. Despite the on-scene commanders efforts to correct their errors in the initial after-action reports, administration officials focused instead on the first SIGINT reports to the exclusion of all other evidence. 2, pp. The Tonkin Gulf Incident in the past two decades has been treated by at least three full-scale studies, dealt with at length by Congressional committees and extensively referenced in general histories, presidential memoirs and textbooks on the U.S. legislative function. Related:LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. Moreover, the subsequent review of the evidence exposed the translation and analysis errors that resulted in the reporting of the salvage operation as preparations for a second attack. Conspiracy FACT #8: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - YouTube The Gulf of Tonkin incident - Vietnam War Reinforced by Turner Joy, Herrick returned to the area on Aug. 4. William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part II, 1961-1964, pp. Both were perceived as threats, and both were in the same general area at about the same time. After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking further action, he radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft." Unlike much else that followed, this incident is undisputed, although no one from the US government ever admitted publicly that the attack was likely provoked by its covert actions. the Gulf of Tonkin Conspiracy But by the end of June, the situation had changed. Although McNamara did not know it at the time, part of his statement was not true; Captain Herrick, the Desoto patrol commander, did know about the 34A raids, something that his ships logs later made clear. Suns and Stars Two hours later the Phu Bai SIGINT station transmitted a critic report warning of possible [North Vietnamese] naval operations planned against the Desoto patrol. Twenty-five minutes later, Phu Bai sent a second critic report that said, imminent plans of [North Vietnamese] naval action possibly against Desoto Mission.. When the boats reached that point, Maddox fired three warning shots, but the torpedo boats continued inbound at high speed. In Saigon, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor objected to the halt, saying that "it is my conviction that we must resume these operations and continue their pressure on North Vietnam as soon as possible, leaving no impression that we or the South Vietnamese have been deterred from our operations because of the Tonkin Gulf incidents." Neither the United States nor State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. including the use of armed force" to assist South Vietnam (the resolution passed the House 416 to 0, and the Senate 88 to 2; in January 1971 President Nixon signed legislation that included its "repeal"). 11. . Three days later, she rendezvoused with a tanker just east of the DMZ before beginning her intelligence- gathering mission up the North Vietnamese coast. As such, its personnel in Vietnam were the envy of their Army counterparts in the bush since, as it was commonly put, sailors sleep between clean sheets at night (the grunts were also envious of the Air Force, where you fight sitting down). The electronic intercept traffic cited here is too voluminous to permit a conclusion that somehow everything was the figment of the collective imaginations on both sides. Forty-five minutes after beginning their attack, the commandos withdrew. The attack is a signal to us that the North Vietnamese have the will and determination to continue the war." In fact, the United States had been waging a small, secret war against North Vietnam since 1961. The study debunks two strongly held but opposing beliefs about what happened on both dayson the one hand that neither of the reported attacks ever took place at all, and on the other that there was in fact a second deliberate North Vietnamese attack on August 4. Each sides initial after-action review was positive. This is another government conspiracy that's true. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American soldier casualties. :: Douglas Pike, director of the Indochina Studies Program at the University of California-Berkeley, is the author of the forthcoming "Vietnam and the U.S.S.R.: Anatomy of an Alliance.". These types of patrols had previously been conducted off the coasts of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. History is a guide to navigation in perilous times.

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